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Abstract  
 
We provide an impact assessment of Brexit using a dynamic Computable General Equilibrium 
model. Three scenarios are considered: (a) no deal with the EU i.e. revert to WTO scenario in 
March 2019; (b) agree an extension to Article 50 between the UK and EU a status quo scenario; 
(c) negotiate a comprehensive EU-Canada style trade agreement between the EU and UK. We did 
not examine the option of EEA membership as this would cut across the UK Government’s red 
lines as announced in the Prime Minister’s Lancaster House speech. Our results show that the 
impact on the Welsh economy will be felt primarily through reductions in GDP, GDP per capita, 
trade, investment and employment. In sum, Wales loses under all scenarios, but with smaller losses 
under the status quo scenario. Continuation of an extended status quo for a limited period of time 
is the best policy option. A comprehensive EU-Canada style trade agreement is the next best 
option. Reverting to trading on WTO terms should there be a No Deal between the EU and UK, 
i.e. the two-year Article 50 process comes to an end without an agreement, will generate the highest 
losses.  
 
 
Keywords: Brexit, Computable General Equilibrium Modelling  
JEL classification: C68 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
The referendum held on 23 June, 2016, to decide whether the United Kingdom (UK) should ‘leave’ 
or ‘remain’ in the European Union (EU) led to the ‘leave’ camp winning the vote by 51.9% to 
48.1% of the electorate. The referendum turnout was 71.8%, with more than 30 million people 
voting. The UK result was mirrored in Wales with ‘leave’ accumulating 52.5% of the vote and 
‘remain’ 47.5%. This was not the case in Scotland or Northern Ireland with 62% and 55.8% 
respectively voting to remain.  
In March of 2017 the UK government triggered Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty which signalled 
that the UK would leave or Brexit the EU in March 2019 at the end of the two-year period 
stipulated in that treaty. From the Welsh perspective, concern over the impact of Brexit on the 
Welsh economy is understandable given that Wales is more reliant in terms of exports to the EU 
than the UK as a whole; 67% compared to 49% for the whole of the UK. 
Trading arrangements or regionalism has been a strong feature of international policy making since 
the 1950s (Perdikis, 2007). There are few, if any, precedents for a country leaving a trading 
arrangement. Once countries have entered into trading arrangements they tend to stay in them. 
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Renegotiations have certainly taken place but usually they involve the further reduction of trade 
barriers and the deepening of economic ties. Examples of these are the widening of the EU to 
incorporate the Nordic and Eastern and Central European countries and the establishment of the 
single market in 1992 (Kerr, 2018). 
This lack of precedent makes it essential to understand the economic implications of leaving an 
existing agreement and what are the likely impacts of new trade arrangements once these are in 
place. The leave campaign was centred on several themes, namely the regaining of freedom to 
pursue an independent international trade policy, limiting immigration by controlling the UK’s 
borders, regaining control and pursuing domestic laws and regulations as well as not making 
budgetary contributions set and agreed by the European Commission and European Parliament. In 
other words, by leaving the EU the UK would, as widely understood, regain its economic and 
political sovereignty.  
At this time while the future nature of the EU–UK relationship remains uncertain and undecided 
amid all the noise, one can cling to one certainty: whatever the terms, whether cliff-edge exit or 
amicable separation, the UK will leave the EU at the end of March 2019 (Khorana and Vickers, 
2018). There is, however, little clarity regarding the economic implications of Brexit and what sort 
of trade policy would be adopted following the UK’s departure from the EU - the UK’s largest 
trading partner. Two aspects about the run-up to Brexit are clear. First, the leave campaign did not 
espouse following a protectionist trade policy or in domestic terms a redistributive agenda. Open 
trade and free trade as well as new trade relationships with Commonwealth countries and the 
rapidly growing nations of China, India as well as the US were put forward as alternatives to the 
current membership of the EU. Secondly, the EU membership was considered not to have served 
the economic interests of the UK at large and, particularly, those who were perceived to have been 
left behind in the EU’s widening and deepening. Further, the EU was considered to be protectionist 
in outlook, administratively bureaucratic, sclerotic and hence, stifling entrepreneurial initiative 
which Brexit would address. 
The government has tried to provide some clarity on what form Brexit might take. The Prime 
Minister, in Lancaster House and Florence speeches, stated that the UK would leave both the 
customs union and the single market but seek to have as “close and deep” a relationship, as 
possible, with the EU by negotiating a bespoke trade agreement. The UK government has now 
confirmed its intention to leave the customs union and single market, and accepted the EU’s formal 
text on transition arrangements published on the 7th of February 2018. The Welsh Government’s 
policy position, supported by Plaid Cymru, is based on remaining in the customs union and the 
single market (Welsh Government, 2017). This is primarily attributed to the fact that Welsh trade 
is more dependent on the EU than the rest of the UK. 
The UK government introduced as part of its negotiating strategy with the EU four red lines which 
it believed reflected the wishes of the leave voters. These included, control of immigration, the 
ability of the UK to make its own trade agreements and to be independent of the jurisdiction of the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) or make any contributions to the EU budget. These red lines make 
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it unlikely that the UK will accept, as a permanent relationship with the EU, a Norway style option 
via membership of the European Economic Area (EEA): although this would be the Welsh 
Government’s preferred option. Such a relationship would violate three of the red lines. Norway’s 
relationship gives it access to the single market but in return it has to pay towards its operation (a 
budget contribution), accept the free movement of people and indirectly accept the jurisdiction of 
the ECJ. The ECJ does not have direct jurisdiction over EEA arrangements. These are overseen 
by the European Free Trade Area’s (EFTA) court which follows the jurisprudence of the ECJ so 
closely as to make little difference in practical terms. Norway can though negotiate free trade 
agreements with the rest of the world.   
It is also unlikely that the UK could embark on arrangements similar to those that Switzerland has 
with the EU as these too would be deemed unacceptable. The Swiss arrangement consists of a 
series of agreements covering various sectors of the economy but again the Swiss have to comply 
with the ECJ rulings, and accept the movement of labour. Once again, these arrangements would 
cut across the red lines. 
A relationship similar to that which Turkey has with the EU would also be unacceptable to the 
UK. While Turkey does not have to accept the free movement of labour or contribute to the EU 
budget it does accept EU trade policy as a member of the customs union in manufactured goods. 
As a member of the customs union Turkey cannot negotiate and conclude its own trade agreements 
with other countries in these areas. To accept such an arrangement would mean that the UK would 
cross one of its red lines. 
The UK government’s preferred option seem to be an agreement that mirrors that which Canada 
has with the EU (CETA) but one including free trade in agriculture and financial services. This 
agreement would enable the UK to have its own immigration policy and negotiate its own free 
trade arrangement with the rest of the world and still have free access to the EU for its products. 
The UK would not be subject to the rulings of the ECJ nor would it have to contribute to the EU’s 
budget. This type of trade arrangement is not though without its problems (Hobbs and Kerr, 2015). 
First, it does not give UK products unrestricted access to the single market. Products would have 
to be screened at some point as to their compliance with EU standards, rules and regulations. 
Secondly, UK products would have to meet and abide by the EU’s rules of origin. Thirdly, non-
access to the single market could be problematic for the financial services sector although some 
disagree with this view. The fragmented nature of the single market with regard to financial 
services may mean that the need to access it is not important given the costs involved. To access 
the single market in services would though require the UK to accept the jurisprudence of the ECJ 
and, therefore, cross a red line. 
Slow progress in the initial Brexit negotiations with the EU over the UK’s financial obligations to 
the EU, the complexities surrounding the nature of Northern Ireland border with the Republic of 
Ireland, EU and UK citizen rights and a lack of detailed clarity in the UK’s proposed relationship 
with the EU, suggest the possibility that an agreement may not be reached before the withdrawal 
date is reached. If this is the case the UK and the EU will find that they will be trading with one 
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another under WTO rules. Some have argued that for both pragmatic and ideological reasons it 
would be best for the UK government to accept that this is going to be the likely outcome or the 
outcome for which it should aim.  
The Welsh sectors most reliant on the EU as a principal export market are shown in Table 1. These 
are Food and live animals, Machinery and transport equipment, Manufactured goods, Chemical 
and related products, Misc manufactures, Animal &Veg fats and waxes, Mineral fuels, lubricants 
and related materials, Beverages and tobacco. In seven out of the ten categories listed in table 1 
Wales is more reliant on the EU as a market than the UK as a whole. When it comes to the 
proportion of output accounted for by exports to the EU three sectors in Wales have a higher 
dependence than their counterparts in the UK.  
Several Welsh industries and sectors are vulnerable to the post Brexit trade position; in particular 
machinery and transport equipment, commodities not elsewhere specified, manufactured goods, 
food and live animals and chemicals and related products. While a small proportion of the output 
of the food and live animal sector is exported to the EU it is the principal export market for beef 
and sheep meat (HCC, 2016). The processed food sector also finds the EU a major outlet. Given 
the perishability of its products, geographical proximity and ease of entry and no time consuming 
border checks are of major importance.  
The machinery and transport equipment sector and the manufactured goods categories might be at 
particular risk from a hard Brexit. It may not be tariff rates that cause the principal problems but 
the lack of access to the benefits derived from membership of the single market. While EU import 
tariffs are low (circa 4%) they may have an impact on product costs as they cross the UK/EU 
border several times in the finishing process before they are incorporated into final products. The 
loss of single market benefits could also add to costs estimated to be in the region of 4%-10%. 
Hence clarity for Welsh producers as to what a post Brexit trade relationship with the EU would 
look like is paramount for those dependent on EU trade either directly or indirectly as part of a 
supply chain. Post Brexit policy for agriculture will also be critical. In the context of Wales, upland 
sheep farming would be particularly vulnerable to a WTO rules Brexit (HCC, 2016). 
 
                       Table 1. Welsh exports to the EU by sector most affected include: 
                              
 Wales% to 
EU 
%Sector 
share UK 
% EU    % Sector 
share 
Food and live animals 81 2 71 5 
Beverages and tobacco 39 1 38 2 
Crude materials (inedible) ex fuels 22 2 38 2 
Mineral fuels, lubs and related 41 12 69 7 
Animal and veg oils fats & waxes 44 0 78 0 
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Chemical and related products  59 12 54 18 
Manufactured goods classified by 
material 
67 16 55 9 
Machinery and Transport equip 80 45 43 41 
Misc manufactures 56 10 49 14 
Commodities nes 88 1 16 2 
Total 67 100 49 100 
Source: National Assembly for Wales, HMRC data, 2016 
 
The principal focus of this report is on the impact Brexit will have on the Welsh economy in terms 
of its trade, investment, GDP, per capita GDP and employment. Brexit’s impact will be assessed 
by examining the implications of three different scenarios.  
(i) The first will assume that there is no deal with the EU at the end of the negotiating 
period and that trade with the EU and the rest of the world will be conducted on a WTO 
rules basis.  
(ii) The second scenario will examine a status quo arrangement remaining in place for a 
number of years (2, 3, 5 and 10). This arrangement implies a phased process of 
implementation to prepare for the new arrangements between the EU and UK. This 
would give businesses and individuals enough time to plan and prepare for those new 
arrangements 
(iii) The third will deal with a Canada style plus free trade agreement scenario with the EU 
under which tariffs on goods would be reduced.  
In addition to this brief introduction the report proceeds to outline its methodology and provide an 
analysis of results for the three scenarios outlined above based using a dynamic computable 
general equilibrium (CGE) modelling framework. We conclude with a summary of our results and 
draw some comparisons with other studies conducted for the UK and some of its regions, including 
Wales.  
2. Data and Scenarios Modelled  
In this section we briefly summarise the model specifications and assumptions that underlay the 
analysis as well as the scenarios that were developed and simulated. The outcomes of these 
simulations are presented in the next section. 
We use a dynamic CGE model based on the Global Trade Analysis Program (GTAP) 9.2 version 
of Data base to capture the dynamic effects of Brexit. To allow disentangling the effects of Brexit, 
from the perspective of its impact on the Welsh economy, we use a regional aggregation that 
includes: Wales, Rest of the UK, Rest of the EU, and the Rest of the World. The country 
aggregation employed for this study is at Appendix Table, A-1. 
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In the GTAP database, a total of 57 sectors are specified. The final list of sectors that are analysed 
along with sectoral mapping used for this study, can be found in Appendix Table A-2. Our starting 
point is the GTAP 9.2 Data Base, which has the base year of 2011. 
The available macroeconomic and input-output (IO) data has been projected from the Welsh IO 
Table, and is used for running the model. The Welsh IO table was taken from the website1 and 
shares of inputs compiled for each sector.2  We obtained the following datasets from the IO table: 
a) Production by sector 
b) Consumption by sector 
c) Use of different intermediate inputs from different sectors in different industries for 
production. 
d) Use of primary inputs for production in each industry 
e) Exports and imports 
f) Various taxes 
g) Cost shares of each input in production costs (e.g. share of steel costs in auto industry 
production) 
h) Sales shares for each commodity in every industry (e.g. share of steel use in auto industry 
in total sales of steel across industries). 
We also use the Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) and macro data (GDP, aggregate consumption, 
investment, exports, imports) for Wales for this study. 
In the GTAP Database, the UK is a single country. We develop intra UK regions from the 
aggregate to be: Wales and the rest of the UK. For Wales, we used the IO table and macro-
economic and trade data available; for the rest of the UK, we take the residual between the UK 
and Wales datasets. We employ SplitReg, a tool to disaggregate the UK into Wales and the rest of 
                                                          
1 https://www.cardiff.ac.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0010/698869/input-output-tables-2007-final-30-6.pdf 
2 We obtained the Gross Value Added data, by industry, which is consistent with the 
GDP  numbers, for 2011, for Wales and rest of the UK. Here is an excerpt from their 
documentation: 
“..These tables are part of the regional gross value added (production approach) release published on 
the 16th December 2016.They show economic activity as measured by gross value added using the 
production approach (GVA(P)) for  NUTS1 and NUTS2 regions of the United Kingdom including industry 
section totals. Estimates of workplace based GVA allocate output to the region in which the economic 
activity takes place. The constant price data underpinning these chained volume measures are not 
constrained to sum to the national total for each industry. Therefore they represent real growth in 
output, rather than in GVA.  
More information can be found in quality note 2 of the accompanying statistical bulletin. Source: 
https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/grossvalueaddedgva/datasets/regionalgrossvalueaddedproductio
napproachregionalgvapunconstraineddatatables” 
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UK (i.e. Scotland, Northern Ireland, England).3 SplitReg multiplied the shares of the macrodataset 
to get the complete GTAP dataset for running the model. Thus, the Splitreg tool employs the share 
of Wales in UK in terms of industrial output, intermediate consumption in each industry, trade at 
bilateral level in each industry, and macroeconomic data, to split UK into these two regions. For 
this, it involves two steps: 
a)  We simply share out all the data in UK GTAP region, into Wales and others. Before doing 
this, we need to make sure the year of reference and currency are the same in the IO table 
and GTAP. Since they are indeed different, the tool would just pick up the shares and use 
the macroeconomic data for 2011 in USD in order to be able to compare it with GTAP 
2011 USD data for the UK as a whole. We also incorporate intra UK trade with no tariffs. 
b) The balance across sectors and regions needs to be restored, since splitting may have 
disturbed it. This is basically the overall supply-demand balance across sectors and regions. 
For this, Splitreg employs the widely used RAS method as well as the entropy method to 
do two things: first, we target the row and column totals of the matrix for the UK to make 
sure that the aggregate UK data is the same as that of GTAP; second, we minimize the 
entropy that captures deviations from balances. 
We do not make any simplifying assumptions to split the data from an aggregate sector into 
disaggregated sectors; nevertheless, some of the sectors are disaggregated to get the GTAP sector 
total to 57. Wherever we required such a level of disaggregation, we assumed the cost and sales 
shares from the UK that are available in the GTAP 9 Data Base for 57 disaggregated sectors, in 
conjunction with the SAM data for the aggregated sectors. For example, if the IO table had textiles 
and apparel as one single sector, with all primary and secondary inputs used by this composite 
sector, we split this sector into separate textiles and apparel sectors by employing the share of 
textiles and apparel in their combined total in the GTAP Data Base. The Welsh sectors, included 
in the Welsh IO table, are split by the share of primary and secondary inputs of the combined total 
in the GTAP database. The methodology applied for this study is similar to an earlier study carried 
out by Narayanan and Khorana (2014) for detailed sectoral analysis in a multi-country framework.  
We begin by developing a baseline (for 2011) to show what the world economy would look like 
without Brexit. In other words, this baseline is established on the basis of projected growth rates 
based on business-as-usual economic performance at the macro level (GDP, population and 
employment) and defined by a macro-econometric forecasting models. The baseline scenario used 
in this paper is estblishd on the baseline developed by International Institute for Applied  Systems 
                                                          
3 SplitReg has been developed to split regions that are commonly bundled together within the GTAP database, such 
as members of ‘XOC’ – Rest of Oceania, which include a multitude of Pacific Island nations (Horridge, 2011), and 
it could also be used to split one country based on simple weights.  
To perform the split using SplitReg, the program requires only proportional value-added information for each sector 
of every new region. Sectors in other regions remain unchanged, and the sum of headers of new regions remain 
equal to the original region, thereby maintaining database balance.  
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Analysis (IIASA’s) Sustainable Socio-economic Pathways (SSPs), which is in turn based on inputs 
from the World Bank and several other international organizations. Such scenarios provide 
different trajectories of growth in GDP, employment and population in the immediate future; they 
include the most pessimistic and most optimistic scenarios - we take a realistic scenario that lies 
between the two extremes. It contains information on macroeconomic variables as well as expected 
policy changes over 2007- 2050. The macroeconomic variables in the baseline include 
observations or projections for real gross domestic product (GDP), population, skilled and 
unskilled labour.4 
For the purpose of this study, three scenarios were developed:  
a) Scenario 1: this assumes No deal with the EU i.e. Revert to WTO scenario in March 
2019. This will reset UK relations with the remaining European members on a default 
World Trade Organization (WTO) rules basis. In the current context it means that there 
would be no formal agreement reached during the negotiations between the UK and the 
EU, which are taking place under the terms of Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty. This 
also suggests that the UK would “crash out” of the trading agreement it has with the 
EU of which the UK is a member. There is a split amongst trade lawyers as to whether 
the UK can “grandfather these agreements. If the UK cannot then it will have to trade 
with its former partners on WTO terms. 
b) Scenario 2: this assumes that an extension to Article 50 is agreed between the UK 
and EU. i.e. transition period allows for continuing status quo for a limited period 
of time, after which the current market access under the single market and 
applicability of the customs union would come to an end. This means the extension 
of Article 50 between the EU and UK allows the economic relations to continue on 
current terms i.e. status quo to end at 2, 3, 5 and 10 years. In other words, this will 
provide for a period that will allow the continuation of current arrangements between 
the EU and UK for a number of years after Brexit.  
c) Scenario 3: Canada-EU style agreement between the UK and EU, based on the 
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA). This scenario eliminates 
98% tariffs between the UK and EU. and includes agricultural products. It does not 
include services and non-tariff barriers that would emanate under any trade agreement.  
 
                                                          
4 The database includes projections for population and economic development, which are the elements that are most 
used as basis of both integrated assessment and IAV studies. Specifically, for the following elements quantifications 
are available: population by age, sex, and education; urbanization; and economic development. 
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3. Main Findings of the Study  
3.1 Scenario one: No Deal, i.e. Exit from the EU without a deal 
This assumes that the two-year Article 50 process comes to an end with no agreement, and that 
the UK would leave the EU on 29 March 2019 with no deal in place.  
This implies that the rules of the WTO rules would apply, i.e. tariffs would be imposed on goods 
traded between the UK and EU. It is assumed, based on the literature (Ciuriak, Dadkhah and Xiao, 
2017), that tariffs on many industrial products would be 2-3%, but on cars these would be 10% 
and on many agricultural products between 20% and 40%.5 
The effects of a No-Deal scenario are as below:  
3.1.1Real GDP 
Tables 2 and 3 summarizes the macroeconomic impacts of the No Deal Brexit scenario on Wales, 
the rest of UK, the rest of the European Union and other regions of interest. Exit by the UK from 
the EU under the assumptions highlighted above generates significant negative impacts for the 
Wales economy, the Rest of United Kingdom, and the EU.  
 By 2027-28, real GDP for Wales is expected to be lower by 0.5 % - 0.6% than would 
otherwise be the case, which is the moderate baseline from IIASA.  
 Real wages of skilled and unskilled labour are expected to be lower by between 2.5 and 
3% than would otherwise be the case.  
 In general, real GDP declines in England, Scotland and Northern Ireland by the end of 
2030. England is the most affected of the three and Scotland bears the smallest effect of 
Brexit by the end of the simulation period. 
 The decline in real GDP for the rest of the European Union and Rest of the World is very 
marginal, ranging from - 0.01 % to - 0.04 % loss of GDP by 2030. 
Table 2: No-Deal: Long-term impact (% Change from baseline: 2011)6 
 
% Change 
Real GDP  -0.6 
Exports -19.7 
                                                          
5 The trade in services would also suffer if nothing was agreed in advance. Under a pure 'no deal' scenario, 
businesses would lose their passporting rights, which allow them to sell their services across the EU without having 
to obtain licences in each individual country. 
 
6 In the baseline year (2011) population is shocked  which means we assume that population grows over time, as a 
result the percent change in GDP and GDP per capita would be different. In terms of the % deviation in policy from 
baseline (which is reported here) if population does not change relative to the baseline, real GDP and real GDP per 
capita would grow at the same rate. 
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Imports -4.9 
Unskilled -2.5 
Skilled  -2.9 
Source: Model simulations.  
Note: Long term is to the end of the simulation year, 2030. 
 
Table 3 shows how No Deal between the UK and EU impacts on other countries. Though there 
are no direct beneficiaries, the overall negative impact of the No-Deal scenario is concentrated in 
and around UK while the negative impact on other regions is either zero (USA) or rather muted 
(China and India, for example).7  
                 
   Table 3: % GDP Impacts of No-Deal, Relative to Baseline, by country 
Regions 2020 2025 2030 
RestofUK -0.41 -0.44 -0.48 
Wales -0.50 -0.55 -0.59 
United States 0.00 0.00 0.00 
China -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
India -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 
Rest of EU -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 
Rest of the World -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
Source: Calculations by the authors 
 
3.1.2 Sectoral Impact  
Figure 1 illustrates the long-term impact on sectoral output. We note that manufacturing sectors, 
such as petrochemicals and minerals, autos, machine equipment, etc., see the largest decline in 
output by the year 2030. Meat, livestock and other food sectors exhibit a similar declining trend 
by the end of 2030.  
Further, any sectoral gains in the No-Deal scenario are concentrated in transport, communication 
and service sectors. This is because of the lower competition from imports in these sectors, which 
depend less on imports for their own production. 
The food and agricultural sectors (represented here by crops and grains) see no substantial impact 
from the scenario under consideration. This is because some of them are perishable and not traded much; 
                                                          
7 Note that following Brexit some countries could benefit in terms of market share gains in both the UK and EU 
markets. 
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the traded commodities among them see some gains due to being shielded from imports. There are some 
demand losses due to increased prices, hence the positive and negative effects cancel out.  
Note that the results are dynamic in that these are driven by a combination of factors including the 
direct EU-export intensity of the sector, size of the sector, sensitivity of the sector to 
competitiveness effects and regional linkages that evolve over years in future. 
 
Figure 1: Long term changes in output in the No-Deal scenario (% change from baseline) 
 
 
Source: Model simulations.  
See the Appendix for definition of sectors and mapping to GTAP 57 commodities 
 
3.1.3 Trade Effect 
Figure 2 presents the long-term impact (by end of 2030) of the No-Deal scenario on Current 
Account balance of Wales.  
There is positive trade balance for the extraction sector, which includes forestry, fishing, and 
minerals, owing to greater increase in exports than in imports and some marginal gain from exports 
of crops. The reason for gains in exports is the reduced demand for imports, which lets the domestic 
production expand, to the extent that it can cater to increased exports, since domestic demand 
expansion is also small. But these gains are small compared to the general deterioration in the trade 
balance of other sectors by the end of the simulation period. As shown in table 4, the terms of trade 
effects8 are slightly positive for Wales. 
                                                          
8 Terms of trade effects are defined as the changes in the relative price of imports in terms of exports, i.e., the ratio 
of export prices to import prices. It can be interpreted as the amount of imported goods an economy can purchase 
per unit of exported goods 
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Figure 2: Change in Trade Balance: Long term impact from the No-Deal scenario 
 
Source: Model simulations.  
 
 
Figure 3: Long term No-Deal scenario impact on Wales’ Volume of Trade (% change from 
baseline) 
 
 
 
Source: Model simulations.  
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Table 4: Long term impact of No-Deal in the terms of trade (% change from baseline) 
Countries Terms of Trade Changes 
RestofUK 2.08 
Wales 0.60 
United States -0.24 
China -0.09 
India -0.13 
Rest of EU 0.11 
Rest of the World -0.11 
 
3.1.4 Employment Effect 
Figure 4 presents the long term (2030) impact on skilled and unskilled labor demand by industries 
located in Wales. In the previous section, the impact of Brexit on sectoral output suggests that 
much of the positive impact will go to the service sector while other sectors, like manufacturing 
and extraction, see a downturn at the end of 2030. As a result, demand for labor, both skilled and 
unskilled, follows a similar pattern.  
Given that labor income is an important component of household total income, the implication of 
such a sustained decline (as shown in Figure 4 employability of unskilled and skilled labor will 
have serious implications for income distribution and inequality in Wales.  
 
Figure 4: Long term impact from the No-Deal scenario on labor employment 
 (% change from the baseline) 
 
Source: Model simulations.  
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3.1.5 Investment Effect 
Figure 5 represents the impact of such factors on the investment in Wales over the next decade and 
documents a declining investment across the years. This also contributes to the declining real GDP 
that is presented earlier.   
As for Foreign Direct Investment, we see a similar declining trend to the tune of about 0.03-0.04%, 
and over time this effect gets more aggravated with greater negative effects (table 5).  
 
Table 5: % Long term impact on FDI, Public and Private Investment: No Deal Scenario 
 FDI Public Investment Private Investment 
2020 -0.03371 0.8576 -0.0622 
2021 -0.03455 0.8504 -0.00045 
2022 -0.03546 0.8431 -0.00055 
2023 -0.03638 0.8359 -0.00055 
2024 -0.0373 0.8286 -0.00055 
2025 -0.03813 0.8214 -0.00045 
2026 -0.03905 0.8141 -0.00055 
2027 -0.03997 0.8069 -0.00055 
2028 -0.04088 0.7997 -0.00055 
2029 -0.04171 0.7924 -0.00045 
2030 -0.04264 0.7852 -0.00055 
Source: Model simulations.  
 
Public investment increases mainly because of the increased tariff revenue9 due to which the 
public-sector investments have funding under the tariff collection arrangements after Brexit.  But 
this type of investment, however, grows slower with time; in 2020, the growth is 0.86%, while in 
2030 it is 0.79%. Private investment declines but at a slow rate and it gets flattened even more 
with time. In short, the investment effects are largely negative, with the exception of public 
investment. 
  
                                                          
9 One may argue that GDP reduction may outweigh increase in tariff revenue; however, this is an empirical question 
which can only be answered based on the relative changes to imports, tariff revenue and GDP. We observe that, 
given that GDP reduction comes mostly from falling exports and consumption, imports also fall due to a small boost 
in some of domestic production. Further, a rise in tariff revenue outweighs fall in imports. Due to this combination 
of multiple effects, we see the public investment benefit marginally despite a tariff hike. 
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Figure 5: Long term impact of the No-Deal scenario on investment  
 (% change from baseline) 
 
Source: Model simulations.  
 
3.2 Scenario two: Continuation of Status Quo 
Scenario 2: this assumes that an extension to Article 50 is agreed between the UK and EU that 
allows for the continuation of the status quo; that is remaining fully in the EU and its customs 
union and single market. This means the extension of Article 50 between the EU and UK allows 
the current economic relationship to continue on current terms within the existing structure of EU 
rules and regulations. This would effectively mean that the economic status quo would continue 
to apply, which besides the internal market also includes the customs union. The only difference 
is that Britain would no longer take part in decision making on European legislation. The scenario 
assumes that the status quo could continue to be in effect for a period of 2, 3, 5 and 10 years after 
UK’s exit from the EU.10 In other words, during this limited period, the UK would continue to 
benefit from the existing arrangement with the EU. This would imply that the current arrangements 
will continue to be in place until the new ‘bespoke’ arrangement between the EU and UK is agreed, 
and that the UK has a transition arrangement in place.  
 
3.2.1 Real GDP 
Table 6 presents the long-term impact of continuation of the status quo on real GDP across select 
countries of interest.  
                                                          
10 While in reality, it may possibly matter as to whether this transition is agreed upon to begin with or not, in the 
model it doesn't matter as we observe the effects only after the UK exits. This is an essential abstraction for effective 
quantification of these effects as the business uncertainty arising from the uncertainty about transition is difficult to 
capture/model. 
-0.062
-0.061
-0.06
-0.059
-0.058
-0.057
-0.056
-0.055
-0.054
-0.053
-0.052
2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030
17 
 
Table 6: Long term (2030) impact of continuation of the status quo on real GDP 
(% change from baseline)  
 
2 year  
 
3 year  5 year  10 year  
RestofUK -0.47 -0.46 -0.44 -0.40 
Wales -0.57 -0.56 -0.54 -0.50 
United States 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
China -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
India -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 
Rest of EU -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 
Rest of the World -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
Source: Model simulations 
 
For Wales, continuation of the status quo by 2, 3, 5 or 10 years brings a moderate improvement in 
economic gains relative to the hard Brexit scenario, i.e. No Deal. That is to say, the GDP loss by 
2030 under the No Deal scenario is greater than any alternatives presented in Table 6.  
Notwithstanding such a relatively positive effect of status quo, the overall message from Table 6 
is that the continuation of status quo for a limited period is damaging to the economic wellbeing 
of the Welsh economy. In other words, if Wales does not have sufficient time with the status quo, 
it is likely to get adversely affected. This is because Wales can reap the benefits of being within 
the EU until Brexit happens, which means that delaying the exit could be useful to the Welsh 
economy, as it is for the rest of UK. While there is marked difference across countries in terms of 
losses to real GDP, the Welsh economy suffers the most (when compared with other regions in the 
UK) under status quo arrangements.  
Table 7 presents the long run impact of the continuation of the status quo arrangement on some 
key macro-economic variables of interest. The figures reported are percentage changes from the 
2011 baseline by the end of the simulation period, which is 2030.  
Results suggest that continuation of the status quo brings substantial differential loss reduction in 
terms of macro impact to the Welsh economy. This is evident from substantial contraction in 
aggregate exports and decline in wages, both skilled and unskilled labor. 
 
Table 7: Macroeconomic impact of status quo continuation (% change from baseline) 
 
2 year  3 year 5 year 10 year 
Real GDP -0.57 -0.56 -0.54 -0.50 
Exports -19.62 -19.57 -19.46 -19.24 
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Imports -4.89 -4.90 -4.92 -4.98 
Real Wages 
    
Unskilled -2.47 -2.46 -2.46 -2.45 
Skilled  -2.75 -2.75 -2.74 -2.71 
Source: Model simulations 
 
3.2.2 Sectoral Impact 
Similar to the No-Deal scenario, the long term output effect of continuing with the status quo are 
presented in Figure 6 in percentage changes in output, as deviation from the baseline in 2030. The 
figures indicate a structural shift for the Welsh economy away from manufacturing towards 
services.  
 
Figure 6. Long term impact of the Status-quo on sector output (% change from baseline) 
 
Source: Model simulations 
 
The downturn in economic activity of the non-service sectors should be a cause for concern for 
policy makers. While there is no denying that the service sector could bring its own source of 
growth dynamics, without the growth in other supporting sectors, relying on the service sector to 
sustain economic growth and overall social wellbeing is a risky policy choice from the perspective 
of diversity in the economy. 
The sectoral impacts differ slightly from the No-Deal scenario reported earlier. This reflects both 
the structure of the shock and the impact of the current scenario on services and the overall 
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manufacturing sector. The sectoral impacts also reflect the larger changes in real wages (see figure 
on employment effects), which is expected to have a differential impact depending on how skilled 
labour intensive a particular sector is and how sensitive sectors are to changes in competitiveness 
that is brought about in 2030 by the extended continuation of the status-quo. During the period of 
the status quo, there would be no changes in competitiveness relative to the baseline but this would 
change after the implementation of Brexit which would involve an arrangement to be decided 
between the UK and EU.  
 
3.2.3 Employment Effect 
The returns to factors employed in the production process (labor, for example) is an important 
indicator of the impact of policy on eventual income distribution.  
Figure 7 shows that continuation of the status-quo is detrimental to the real payments to skilled 
and unskilled labor employed across sectors. This is a long-term impact and needs be considered 
as such with the implication that despite anticipated adjustments to the economy, both skilled and 
unskilled labor demand will decline and payments to those factors will fall in all the status-quo 
scenarios considered in the simulations. The fall in skilled labour is pronounced compared to real 
returns to unskilled labor because the sectors that employ skilled labour (manufacturing, 
pharmaceuticals, to mention a few) reduce their output/production the most while sectors that 
traditionally use unskilled labor (like grains and crops in our model) show little change in output 
contraction.  
 
Figure 7: Long term impact of the status-quo on factor returns  
(% change from baseline) 
 
Source: Model simulations 
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3.2.4 Trade Effects 
The Welsh Government publishes Export Statistics each year which provide an estimate of exports 
to the rest of the European Union. This helps identify those sectors which not only trade the most 
with the EU but also for which the EU comprises a large share of the UK’s international export 
market.  
 
Table 8 presents the structure of Welsh exports for 2011, the baseline year. This analysis identifies 
manufacturing, machinery and equipment, and automotive as some of the most prominent exports 
to USA, China, Rest of the European Union, and other countries. Wholesale and retail trade, 
transportation, communication and various professional services are the areas to focus upon among 
services sectors. 
 
                   Table 8: Welsh exports by destination (% share for each country)  
 
USA China India Rest of 
EU 
ROW 
Grains 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Crops 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.10 
Meat 0.10 0.20 0.00 1.00 0.30 
Othfood 3.10 1.60 1.50 5.10 4.60 
Othcrops 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Extract 5.30 11.20 48.90 13.80 8.60 
Other 
manufactures 2.60 10.50 3.50 4.30 4.20 
Pchemineral 37.10 12.40 7.50 40.00 24.50 
Autos 7.60 28.00 3.50 10.50 11.00 
Machine 
Equipments 27.70 33.40 27.00 21.40 36.50 
Utilities 0.40 0.10 0.40 0.50 1.10 
Construction 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 
Trade, transport & 
Communication 0.70 0.20 1.10 0.40 0.80 
OthServ 15.50 2.30 6.30 2.40 8.00 
 Total 100 100 100 100 100 
          Source: GTAP Database 2011and author’s computations.  
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Given the structure of Wales’s exports, it emerges that the hardest hit sectors from the continuation 
of the status-quo are manufacturing (automotive, machinery and equipment), extraction, and 
pharma-chemical sectors. This is shown in Figure 8. Again, this figure shows that continuing the 
status-quo (for two, three, five or ten years) has a marginal differential impact on the trade balance.  
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Figure 8: Trade balance effects of the status-quo (million US$) 
 
Source: Model simulation 
 
As seen from table 9, the status quo scenario has less negative effects on both exports and imports 
in most industries, compared to the ‘no deal’ scenario. Since the effects occur almost in the year 
when the policy change happens, with no major effects in the other years, the effects are almost 
the same irrespective of when the status quo ends (2, 3, 5 or 10 years). In the terms of trade, as 
seen from table 10,Wales gains slightly. 
Table 9: The long term (2030) Impact of Status-quo on Wales’ export and imports (% change 
from baseline) 
Products Exports Imports 
2 Year 3 Year 5 Year 10 Year 2 Year 3 Year 5 Year 10 Year 
Grains -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Crops 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 
Meat -3.5 -3.5 -3.5 -3.5 -1.7 -1.7 -1.7 -1.7 
Other food -4.1 -4.1 -4.1 -4.1 -1.3 -1.3 -1.3 -1.3 
Other crops 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Extract -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 -1.8 -1.8 -1.7 -1.7 
Other mnfcs -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.3 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 
Petrochemineral -3.8 -3.8 -3.8 -3.8 -0.7 -0.7 -0.7 -0.7 
Autos -4.7 -4.6 -4.6 -4.6 -0.7 -0.7 -0.7 -0.7 
Mach 
equipment 
-3.0 -3.0 -3.0 -2.9 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.6 
Utilities -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
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Construction 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 
Trade transport 
and 
communication 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Other Services -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 
Source: Model simulations.  
 
Table 10: Long term (2030) impact of maintaining the status-quo on terms of trade (% 
change from baseline) 
 
Countries 2 Year 3 Year 5 Year 10 Year 
RestofUK 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.9 
Wales 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.5 
United States -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 
China -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 
India -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 
Rest of EU 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Rest of the World -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 
Source: Model simulations.  
 
3.2.5 Investment Effect 
The overall impact of the continuation of status-quo on investment is negative, but it improves 
with a longer transition period. Figure 9 shows the long term (2030) impact on investment. The 
economy faces an initial negative shock to investment, which may aggravate with time; therefore, 
the later the beginning of shock (losing the status quo), the less negative is the effect on investment. 
Like we saw in the ‘no deal’ scenario, we observe a marginal change in FDI (about 0.03-0.04% 
reduction in FDI), considerable increase in public investment (about 0.8-0.9%) and marginal 
decline in private investment (about 0.0004%). There are not many large differences across the 
transition periods, but broadly, we observe that the greater the transition period, the lower the 
negative impact on private investment and FDI and the lower the positive effect on public 
investment. 
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Figure 9: Long term impact of status-quo on investment (% change from baseline) 
 
Source: Model simulations.  
 
3.3 Scenario three: Canada style UK-EU Free Trade Area 
This section presents the economic impacts of the UK forming a CETA style FTA with the 
European Union. This agreement, for example, eliminates 98% of tariffs between Canada and EU. 
It does not, however, necessarily eliminate all non-tariff barriers. 
As with other such regional trade agreements, this FTA is supposed to eliminate bilateral tariffs. 
Here we assume that implementation of the FTA is undertaken in 2019. We should stress that this 
exercise is undertaken to highlight the alternative routes the UK could potentially take to help 
mitigate the negative impact of Brexit that was highlighted in the previous sections.  
 
3.2.1 Real GDP 
Table 11 presents the macroeconomic results for alternative policy options.  
First, as far as Wales is concerned, UK-EU FTA brings substantially different macroeconomic 
results compared to the No-Deal scenario presented earlier. The FTA provides an improvement 
over the Brexit long term outcome  of  a No deal and the economic gains are spread in all areas of 
macroeconomic indicators. For example, looking at the first row in Table 6, the long term growth 
impact of the FTA provides a marked improvement over that of Brexit’s long term outcome with 
no deal between the UK and EU.  A similar trend is observed when examining output and the trade 
balance results.  
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Second, while the long term impact of a UK-EU CETA style FTA are not necessarily positive, it 
represents a marked improvement over the Brexit scenarios we considered earlier. This is driven 
by a marked change in the long term impact on output of specific sectors (for example, 
manufacturing) and substantial improvement in the trade balance of Wales. 
 
Table 11. Long-term macroeconomic impact of alternative scenarios until 2030 (% 
Change from baseline)  
Status Quo No-Deal 
Scenario 
CETA- Style FTA 
 2-yr 3-yr 5-yr 10-yr   
Real GDP -0.57 -0.56 -0.54 -0.50 -0.59 -0.06 
Exports -19.62 -19.57 -19.46 -19.24 -19.70 -0.91 
Imports -4.89 -4.90 -4.92 -4.98 -4.87 -0.10 
Unskilled -2.47 -2.46 -2.46 -2.45 -2.47 -0.13 
Skilled  -2.75 -2.75 -2.74 -2.71 -2.76 -0.12 
 
 Source: Model simulations 
 
Figure 10 presents the overall growth pattern of the Wales economy under hard Brexit and UK-
EU FTA through to 2030. Please note that the red line (growth of GDP under the UK-EU FTA) 
has the y-axis on the right side of the picture, and that side has a much smaller scale compared to 
the y axis on the left hand side. What this means is that while both Brexit and UK-EU FTA lead 
to economic downturns over the next ten years, the magnitudes of these scenarios are markedly 
different. Under the UK-EU FTA, Wales real GDP is expected to be between 0.01 and 0.06 percent 
lower than otherwise would be the case in 2030.  
 
Figure 10: Growth patterns of real GDP under alternative trade regimes 
   (% change from the baseline) 
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Source: Model simulations 
 
3.3.2 Sectoral Impact  
If the UK concludes an agreement with the EU on CETA lines, UK-EU goods trade would continue 
to be tariff free and there would be no new barriers to trade between the UK and the EU, and these 
would be primarily non-tariff barriers but a set of rules of origin would apply. Note that a FTA 
between the EU and UK on the CETA model would not provide the same level of market access 
as membership of the Single Market, as it would not include services.  
Concluding a CETA style FTA after Brexit would lead to the smallest increase in UK-EU trade 
costs and our analysis below shows it is the least bad option for the Welsh economy. Table 12 
compares the cumulative percentage change in output from the baseline by 2030 following a No 
Deal scenario and a CETA style UK-EU FTA.  
Overall, the Welsh sectors that would be most negatively affected by the exit of the UK from the 
European Union would be automotive production, meat and agricultural processing industries and 
the pharma-chemical manufacturing sectors. The hardest hit sector from the UK-EU FTA is the 
meat production and processing sector, while the rest of the Welsh economy shows marginal 
declines.  
 
Table 12: Long term output impact of alternative trade scenarios  
(% change from baseline by 2030) 
Sectors No-Deal CETA-Style FTA 
Grains -0.01 0.00 
Crops 0.00 0.00 
Meat -0.60 -0.17 
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Othfood -0.83 -0.01 
Othcrops 0.00 0.00 
Extract -0.22 -0.01 
Omnfcs -0.05 -0.01 
Pchemineral -0.94 -0.02 
Autos -0.90 0.00 
Machequip -0.56 -0.01 
Utilities -0.07 0.00 
Construction 1.53 0.09 
Trdtrnscomm -0.11 -0.02 
OthServ 0.81 0.02 
Source: Model simulations. 
 
3.3.3 Employment Effect 
Figure 11 presents the long term (2030) impact of the UK-EU CETA style FTA on skilled and 
unskilled labor demand by industries located in Wales. In the previous section, i.e. No Deal and 
CETA scenarios, we have seen the impact of Brexit on sectoral output and told the story that much 
of the positive impact will go to the service sector while other sectors like manufacturing and 
extraction see downturns at the end of 2030. Here the story is quite the opposite. What we see in 
in Figure 11 is that there is little output contraction following the UK-EU FTA and, hence, the 
changes in demand for skilled and unskilled labor are both small and follow the direction of output 
change.  
 
Figure 11: UK-EU FTA based on CETA: impact on labor demand 
 (% change from the baseline by 2030) 
  
28 
 
 
Source: Model simulations.  
 
Note: skilled labor demand for the meat sector declined by 31% while demand for unskilled labour 
by the same sector declined by about 24%. These changes were too big to put in the same figure 
as the changes in labor demand by the other sectors. Hence, we removed the bars for labour 
demand changes by the meat sector.  
 
3.3.4 Trade Effects 
In the terms of trade effects (Table 13 xx), the sectors that would be negatively affected by the exit 
of the UK from the EU would be machinery and equipment production, the automotive sector and 
the pharma-chemical manufacturing complex.  
This picture completely changes once the UK forms a CETA style FTA with the EU (Table 13). 
Now, the overall structure of the trade balance, while qualitatively the same, improves in 
magnitude. That is to say, more often than not, the sectors that suffer under a no deal Brexit still 
show negative trade balances under a UK-EU FTA but the deficit in trade balance is smaller in 
magnitude. 
 
Table 13: Long-term impact of alternative trade deals on the Trade Balance 
for Wales: 2030 (Million US$) 
Sectors No-Deal CETA-Style 
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Scenario FTA 
Grains -1 2 
Crops 45 4 
Meat -638 -213 
Othfood -978 6 
Othcrops 1 0 
Extract 808 -6 
Omnfcs -121 -8 
Pchemineral -1198 -2 
Autos -1457 -11 
Machequip -1486 -55 
Utilities -22 -1 
Construction -128 -8 
Trdtrnscomm -39 -2 
OthServ -352 -21 
  Source: Model simulations.  
 
Table 14 (and figure 12) show the aggregate changes in imports and exports across policy scenarios 
by comparing results for different countries of interest. Again, both exports and imports show 
improvement, in absolute terms, compared to the no deal Brexit scenario. It is clear from table 13 
that all four members of the UK stand to lose under a no Deal scenario. The situation is not as dire 
in the CETA scenario but there are still declines in exports. The terms of trade effects on Wales 
from a CETA style scenario is positive but negligible (table 14). 
 
 
    Table 14: Long term trade impact of alternative scenarios: 2030 
(% change from baseline) 
 
Countries 
No Deal CETA style FTA 
Exports Imports Exports Imports 
RestofUK -21.75 -3.19 -1.13 0.03 
Wales -19.70 -4.87 -0.91 -0.10 
United States 2.00 -0.67 0.05 -0.02 
China 1.19 -0.27 -0.01 0.01 
India 1.68 -0.36 0.01 0.00 
Rest of EU -1.61 -0.42 0.00 -0.03 
Rest of the World 0.81 -0.34 0.04 -0.02 
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       Source: Model simulations 
 
Figure 12: Long term CETA-Style scenario impact on Wales’ Export and Import (% change 
from baseline) 
  
 
Source: Model simulations.  
 
 
 
Table 15: Long term impact from CETA-style FTA on the terms of trade: 2030 (% change 
from baseline) 
Countries Terms of Trade 
RestofUK 0.20 
Wales 0.03 
United States -0.01 
China 0.00 
India 0.00 
Rest of EU -0.01 
Rest of the World -0.01 
Source: Model simulations.  
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3.3.5 Investment effects 
There are still small negative effects on investment as a result of a CETA-style FTA (Table 16), 
but there is an initial bump in FDI that fades off an becomes negative over time. The initial bump 
comes from reduced imports that may induce foreign firms to invest in Wales to substitute imports 
–called tariff-escalating investment in literature. Public investment increases strongly, albeit with 
a diminishing growth over time – from 0.8-0.86%. Private investment faces a small decline. 
 
Table 16: Investment effects of CETA-style FTA (% change from baseline) 
 Total Investment FDI Public Inv Private Inv 
2020 -0.0005 0.00002 0.8576 -0.0622 
2021 -0.0011 -0.00079 0.8504 -0.00045 
2022 -0.0017 -0.0016 0.8431 -0.00055 
2023 -0.0023 -0.00241 0.8359 -0.00055 
2024 -0.003 -0.00331 0.8286 -0.00055 
2025 -0.0036 -0.00412 0.8214 -0.00045 
2026 -0.0042 -0.00493 0.8141 -0.00055 
2027 -0.0048 -0.00575 0.8069 -0.00055 
2028 -0.0054 -0.00656 0.7997 -0.00055 
2029 -0.006 -0.00736 0.7924 -0.00045 
2030 -0.0066 -0.00817 0.7852 -0.00055 
Source: Model simulations.  
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4. Summary and Discussion 
Based on our analysis of different scenarios, namely, ‘no deal’, ‘status quo’ and a ‘CETA-style 
FTA’, the main findings suggest that all scenarios lead to losses for the Welsh economy.  
The ‘status quo’ scenario is the least negative. The longer the transition period, the less negative 
are the macro, output, trade and investment effects of this scenario.  
The next least negative is the CETA style agreement. The most negative for the Welsh economy 
is if the UK were to revert to the WTO terms under the no agreement scenario. We conclude that 
no deal is certainly not a sensible option for the Welsh economy. It is in recognition of this that 
both the Economists for Free Trade (2016) and Policy Exchange analyses propose that the UK 
should adopt a unilateralist approach to the removal of trade restrictions and reduce regulations 
and standards to a minimum in order to cut costs to domestic firms.  
There are serious questions regarding the analyses carried out by the Economists for Free Trade 
group. For example, they assume that the differences seen in producer prices between the EU/UK 
and the rest of the world are the result of EU regulations and account for 10% of the differences in 
prices. Eliminating these EU regulations would lead to lower prices in the UK and also give UK 
produced goods a competitive edge in international markets. It has been argued that this approach 
is wrong in that price differences could be the result of EU consumer preferences for higher quality 
and therefore more expensive products (Sampson, et al, 2017). There are also doubts regarding the 
quality of the price data used and therefore its applicability (Sampson et al, 2017) The removal of 
EU regulatory standards would not necessarily have a positive impact on firm output and 
competitiveness (Winters, 2017).   
The Economists for Free Trade also misunderstand the positive role of regulatory standards. 
Standards can remove uncertainties in the market place for consumers and encourage producers to 
improve product quality (Issac et al, 2004). In any case lower quality products that did not meet 
EU standards would be excluded from the EU so it is unlikely that there would be any cost savings 
to UK firms as a result of their removal or reduction. In any case UK producers would have to 
meet the standards set in other countries to achieve access to their markets. It is therefore unlikely 
that the removal of EU regulatory standards per se would have much of a positive impact on 
exports. Domestic working practices and regulations are another matter. The UK would be able to 
change these and they might have an impact on costs of production. 
A further issue with the Economists for Free Trade is the impact that the unilateral reduction in 
trade barriers would have on domestic industries. They acknowledge that there would be a rapid 
decline in manufacturing and the agricultural sectors and as a result an adverse impact on the 
distribution of income.  While it is inevitable that in the long run these sectors may decline as 
comparative advantage shifts away from the UK to other locations the economic and social impacts 
on Wales could be very severe in the short to medium term. 
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Our results tend to support the work recently carried out by several bodies and institutions on the 
impact of Brexit (Black, 2017; Fraser of Allander Institute, 2016; Dhingra, et al, 2016; Dhingra et 
al, 2017; Scottish Government, 2018; Khorana and Vickers, 2018). Values arrived by the studies 
vary as a result of applying different methodologies and starting points and scenarios but they 
indicate that Brexit would have a negative impact on the UK and the regions on which they carry 
out their studies. Dhingra, (2017) calculates the local economic effects by county and presents 
estimates among others for Wales (see table A3).  
As we were putting together the final draft of our report the Welsh Government published its Trade 
Policy: the issues for Wales (Welsh Government, (2018). The report incorporates work carried out 
by Cardiff University Business School which summarises the sectors in Wales most at risk from 
Brexit. It differs to our study in quantifying the Welsh sectoral losses to be incurred from Brexit. 
Given our limited resources and time constraints our report concentrated on four impacts arising 
from Brexit. These were the expected direct and indirect effects of tariffs on exports, the effect of 
tariffs on firm inputs, the effect of non-tariff barriers on firm inputs and sectoral trade and activity 
and finally the effects on the Welsh economy of changes in sector activity. The Cardiff Business 
School study included those aspects as well as taking into account the labour market risks 
associated with Brexit, losses resulting from the loss of access to EU sectoral networks and 
institutions, firm investment decisions as a result of maturing product cycles and firms’ strategic 
locational decisions with regard to production and other forms of activity.11 Had our study included 
these aspects it is likely that the losses we identify would have been larger and more in line with 
their results. 
Interestingly the report identifies Aerospace systems and services, the automotive sector, Electrical 
engineering components and semiconductors, Chemicals and steel as high risk sectors most 
vulnerable to the imposition of tariff and non-tariff barriers on their output and or inputs. Those 
with medium risk involved Food and drink, Information and communications technology, 
Medical/Health products and services and other advanced manufacturing and engineering. The 
sectors most vulnerable from the imposition of trade barriers overlap with our own to a 
considerable extent although sectoral definitions differ slightly. Interestingly that report, 
highlighting the views of the Confederation of British Industry, the Federation of Small Business 
and the British chambers of Commerce, also calls for a lengthy status quo transition period. It 
envisages a WTO rules based trading relationship as the worse possible case for business. 
Our study shows that both the EU and the rest of the world will also be negatively affected by 
Brexit although to a smaller extent. It is sobering to see that the negative GDP impact of Brexit on 
the EU is estimated to be in the region of -0.04% whereas for Wales it ranges from -0.5% to -
0.59% over the period under study. For the rest of the UK the figure ranges from -0.41% to -0.48%. 
These figure might well shape and impact on the way the negotiations with the EU are conducted. 
If we accept that a smaller market in terms of GDP will mean a loss of economic welfare for both 
                                                          
11 See: http://gov.wales/topics/businessandeconomy/welsh-economy/eu-transition-and-economic-
prospects-for-large-and-medium-sized-firms-in-wales/?skip=1&lang=en 
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parties it follows that both will be required to increase their individual share of a smaller market if 
they want to maintain their previous levels of economic welfare. Negotiations could, therefore, 
prove difficult from the UK perspective particularly as the EU loses less proportionally to the UK 
and  
Public investment will see an increase under all these scenarios, mainly because of the revenue 
boost from higher tariffs12. There may be some crowding out of FDI and private investment, partly 
because of the fact that costs in the economy rise and consequently, expected returns on investment 
fall over time in all these scenarios. We have not adjusted the flow of public funds in line with the 
Barnet formula which could reduce the funds available for public spending in Wales. 
Renegotiating the UK’s relationship with the EU starting from a position of relative weakness is 
difficult for businesses. Firms and, in particular, multinational companies need to have a clear 
understanding of the business environment in which they are operating as it will impact on both 
their production and location strategies. It is accepted that firms like to influence and engage with 
government in the formulation of economic policies that will impact on them (Lawton, et al 2009). 
Once the policies have been formulated firms then need to absorb what has been or is to be 
implemented and accordingly adjust their corporate strategies with regard to product quality, 
design production methods, and location. Finally firms will need to engage with any aspects of 
compliance and enforcement that the policy requires. Hence clarity in understanding what goals 
have been set by the UK government is paramount. The lack of clarity in the goals to be achieved 
in the Brexit negotiations and in particular the details involved makes it very difficult for UK and 
Welsh business to engage properly with the process. 
 
5. Conclusion 
The scenario simulations reveal that Brexit will lead to the imposition of costs, either through the 
imposition of tariffs or the loss of preferential access to the single market. The impact on the Welsh 
economy will be felt via reductions in GDP, GDP per capita, trade, investment and employment. 
The least costly outcome for Wales is if the status quo can be held to for as long as possible. The 
next best or next least worst is the conclusion of a CETA type agreement with the EU. The most 
costly is a Brexit based on WTO rules.  
Our results chime with both economic theory and empirical work carried out by the majority of 
other researchers as well as those of the Welsh Government laid out in their recent document on 
Trade Policy. 
                                                          
12 While we don’t make a specific assumption that an increased tariff revenue in the UK will lead to greater public 
investment in Wales, such a possibility is consistent with the closed accounting nature of a CGE model; all income 
and expenditure should equal, meaning that any increase in the government’s tax revenue must partly be used for 
public investment. Since we consider Wales as a separate region herein, the tariff revenue that is available for Welsh 
public investment is just a portion of the share of Wales in total UK tariff revenue. To this extent, we capture the 
fact that only a small portion of UK tariff revenue may be used to support/provide Welsh public investment. 
35 
 
From the point of view of theory moving from a relatively “free trade” position with a partner to 
something less will inevitably lead to losses in economic welfare (Viner, 1950).  
For those negotiating Brexit with the EU or attempting to influence those negotiations the principal 
objective should be to mitigate the costs involved as far as possible. This can be achieved either 
by obtaining an arrangement that will grant as much access to the EU for Welsh products and/or 
undertaking domestic policy changes to reduce the costs to business. Some researchers have 
advocated that the UK should adopt a unilateral free trade policy and remove domestic regulations 
to achieve these lower costs. We have not attempted to review this policy proposal in the context 
of Wales in this report but respectfully suggest that this might be an avenue to pursue in order to 
clarify such a policy’s impact on Wales.  
While a free trade policy is accepted amongst economists as maximizing economic welfare, in 
particular for a “small” country its success is dependent on there being a well-functioning 
multilateral system based on internationally accepted rules and policed by a dispute settlement 
procedure to which all nations ascribe (Kerr and Perdikis, 2014). In the current international 
climate there are concerns as to whether this multilateral system will operate as it has in the past. 
If uncertainties arise and the multilateral system breaks down it is likely that countries will adopt 
protectionism and “beggar thy neighbour” policies. Should that situation arise then countries 
finding themselves outside economic blocs and arrangements will come under severe economic 
pressure.  
From the policy perspective there is “not a moment to lose”. If the negotiating partners cannot 
meet the deadline of the key European Council meeting on the 22-23 March, the start of trade talks 
could be pushed back, possibly even beyond the next formal EU summit in late June. This would 
jepoardise hopes of having an outline trade accord ready by the end of the year and lead to trade 
with the EU on WTO rules. 
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Table A1. GTAP 57 sector classification and mapping used for analysis  
No. GTAP 
57 
Long Name Aggregate Sectors 
1 Pdr Paddy rice Grains 
2 Wht Wheat Grains 
3 Gro Cereal grains nec Grains 
4 v_f Vegetables, fruit, nuts Crops 
5 Osd Oil seeds Crops 
6 c_b Sugar cane, sugar beet Crops 
7 Pfb Plant-based fibers Crops 
8 Ocr Crops nec Crops 
9 Ctl Cattle,sheep,goats,horses MeatLvstk 
10 oap Animal products nec MeatLvstk 
11 rmk Raw milk OthFood 
12 wol Wool, silk-worm cocoons Crops 
13 Frs Forestry Extraction 
14 fsh Fishing Extraction 
15 coa Coal Extraction 
16 oil Oil Extraction 
17 gas Gas Extraction 
18 omn Minerals nec Extraction 
19 cmt Meat: cattle,sheep,goats,horse MeatLvstk 
20 omt Meat products nec MeatLvstk 
21 vol Vegetable oils and fats OthFood 
22 mil Dairy products OthFood 
23 pcr Processed rice OthFood 
24 sgr Sugar OthFood 
25 ofd Food products nec OthFood 
26 b_t Beverages and tobacco products OthFood 
27 tex Textiles Omnfcs 
28 wap Wearing apparel Omnfcs 
29 lea Leather products Omnfcs 
30 lum Wood products Omnfcs 
31 ppp Paper products, publishing Omnfcs 
32 p_c Petroleum, coal products Chemineral 
33 crp Chemical,rubber,plastic prods Chemineral 
34 nmm Mineral products nec Chemineral 
35 i_s Ferrous metals Extraction 
36 nfm Metals nec Extraction 
37 fmp Metal products Extraction 
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No. GTAP 
57 
Long Name Aggregate Sectors 
38 mvh Motor vehicles and parts Omnfcs 
39 otn Transport equipment nec Machequip 
40 ele Electronic equipment Machequip 
41 ome Machinery and equipment nec Machequip 
42 omf Manufactures nec Omnfcs 
43 ely Electricity Utilities 
44 gdt Gas manufacture, distribution Utilities 
45 wtr Water Utilities 
46 cns Construction Construction 
47 trd Trade Trdtrnscomm 
48 otp Transport nec Trdtrnscomm 
49 wtp Sea transport Trdtrnscomm 
50 atp Air transport Trdtrnscomm 
51 cmn Communication Trdtrnscomm 
52 ofi Financial services nec OthServ 
53 isr Insurance OthServ 
54 obs Business services nec OthServ 
55 ros Recreation and other services OthServ 
56 osg PubAdmin/Defence/Health/Educa
t OthServ 
57 dwe Dwellings OthServ 
 
 
  
38 
 
 
Table A2. GTAP country classification and mapping used for analysis  
Rest of UK England, Northern Ireland and Scotland 
Wales Wales 
USA United States of America 
China China 
India India 
Rest of EU Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia,   
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, 
Lithuania,   
Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
Spain,   
Sweden, Bulgaria, Belarus, Croatia, Romania 
Rest of the World Rest of the World 
 
 
 
 
Table A3. GDP impact on the local authorities of Wales Ten Years after 
Brexit 
Area                                     Soft Brexit (EEA membership)           Hard Brexit (WTO Rules) 
Cardiff -1.3 -2.5 
Vale of Glamorgan -1.3 -2.3 
Swansea -1.2 -2.3 
Newport -1.2 -2.1 
Gwynedd -1.1 -2.0 
Conwy -1.0 -1.9 
Caerphilly -1.2 -1.9 
Blaenau Gwent -1.2 -1.9 
Ceredigion -0.9 -1.8 
Monmouthshire -1.0 -1.8 
Pembrokeshire -1.0 -1.8 
Wrexham -1.1 -1.7 
Carmarthenshire -1.0 -1.7 
Flintshire -1.0 -1.7 
Powys -1.0 -1.6 
Merthyr Tydfil -0.8 -1.5 
Neath Port Talbot -1.0 -1.4 
Anglesey -0.6 -1.2 
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